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Abstract: 
We examine the economy-wide impact of the child support grant (CSG) on the South 
African economy using a bottom-up/top-down approach. This allows us to estimate the 
potential effects on households’ welfare and on the economy following a change in the 
CSG. Three simulations are presented, in simulation 1 the value of the CSG is increased 
by 20%; in simulation 2 the number of beneficiaries among the eligible children is 
increased by two million and simulation 3 combines these two. A positive link between 
the CSG and the probability of participating in the labour market is found. The positive 
impacts on the labour market, together with the increase in the transfers received by 
households, results in an increase in their income. Poverty decreases in comparison 
with the base year for the whole population and for children. Finally, we can conclude 
that simulation 1 is the most cost effective of the policies. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The South African Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced in April 1998 where it 
replaced the child maintenance grant. The adoption of the CSG contributed to South Africa’s 
progressive realisation of the constitutional right to social security as enshrined in article 27 
of the Republic of South Africa Constitution (1996). The grant, which is paid to the child’s 
primary caregiver, is currently the most important form of assistance for children in poor 
families and offers a potential source of protection against poverty. The CSG has expanded 
markedly in recent years, until 2008, it was only available to children aged 0-13 years, in 
2009,  this was extended to include children aged 14 and from 2010 the age of eligibility was 
increased to include children up to the age of 18 years (South Africa Social Security Agency 
(SASSA), 2010). Since 1 April 2012, the CSG amounts to R280 per month, with an estimated 
10 977 000 beneficiaries as of 31 March 2011 (National Treasury, 2011). Given the 
importance and scale of the CSG, this study assesses the economy-wide impact of changes in 
the scheme based on two potential policy changes as well as their combined effect. Firstly, as 
will be discussed in section 2.1, the number of beneficiaries is likely to increase by 2 million 
over the next few years. Secondly, the value of the grant itself is also expected to rise over the 
same period (see section 2.2). Both these two developments will have an impact on the South 
African economy especially as it relates to changes in poverty severity, incidence and depth.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the CSG in South Africa, looking at 
coverage in terms of the number of beneficiaries and changes in eligibility over the years. 
Section 3 briefly reviews literature on the impact of social transfer programmes, while section 
4 discusses the methodology and data used for this study. Section 5 discusses the results of 
the 3 simulations carried out based on the potential changes in the welfare scheme, and then 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CHILD SUPPORT GRANT  
This section gives a brief overview of South Africa’s CSG. It focuses on its reach, 
expenditure and the impact it has had on both poverty and the lives of grant recipients.  
2.1 Reach of the CSG 
At the time of its introduction, the declared goal was for the CSG to reach 3 million children 
within 5 years. Fourteen years later the CSG has expanded rapidly with over 10 million 
beneficiaries, making it the largest social assistance programme in South Africa and one of 
the largest globally. Table 1 shows changes in social grant beneficiaries by type from 2008 
with projections to 2015. From the table, it is clear that the CSG has the highest number of 
beneficiaries growing at 4.9% over the reported period.  
Table 1: Social grants beneficiary numbers by type and province, 2008/07 – 2014/15 in 000's 
 2008/09   2009/10   2010/11   2011/12   2012/13*   2013/14* 2014/15* % Growth 
Type of grant 
    
Projections per year 
Old-age 2,344 2,490 2,647 2724 2,773  2,835   2,881  3.5%  
War veterans 2 1 1 1 1  1   1  -10.9%  
Disability 1,372 1,299 1,212 1216 1,192  1,196   1,196  -2.3%  
Foster care 476 489 490 598 671  769   874  10.7%  
Care dependency 107 119 121 126 131  141   147  5.4%  
Child support 8,765 9,381 10,154 10,903 11,301  11,549   11,659  4.9%  
Total 13,066 13,779 14,625 15,568 16,069  16,491   16,758  4.2%  
Source: National Budget Review (2012) 
* Projected numbers at fiscal year-end.
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This growth has continued despite many initial challenges with the implementation of the 
CSG. These included the lack of equipment in many offices, under staffing of welfare offices, 
lack of uniformity in the application process across provinces and offices, problems with 
accessing vital registration documents (for example, identity documents and birth certificates) 
and difficulties in providing postal addresses (Eyal et al, 2011).  
Although the number of beneficiaries has increased over the years, there is evidence that a 
significant number of eligible children are not able to access the grant. More than 600,000 
maternal orphans are not receiving any grant, a vastly higher proportion than for any other 
group (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit’s National Income Dynamics 
Study, 2008). In addition, disproportionately fewer younger children (0-2 years) as well as 
fewer rural children are accessing the CSG (McEwan et al, 2010). The Department of Social 
Development acknowledges that not all children eligible for the CSG are receiving it, citing 
lack of documentation as the biggest barrier alongside some of the challenges mentioned 
above. According to SASSA (2010), in 2008, 2.1 million children or 27% of those eligible for 
the CSG did not receive it. 
At the regional level, Table 2 indicates that KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape have the 
highest number of children who are benefiting from the CSG with children under 7 years 
being the largest age group of CSG beneficiaries. The figures for these two largely rural 
provinces in particular demonstrate the ability of the CSG to reach large numbers of poor 
children, including those living in deep rural areas.  
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Table 2: Number of Child Support Grants by age and province as at 30 June 2011 
Ages EC FS GAU KZN LIM MPU NW NC WC Total 
(0-1 yrs)  74 455   30 236   66 160   113 815   73 040   37 870   28 969   11 708   35 164   471 417  
(1-2 yrs )  99 812   39 511   92 978   156 402   95 599   57 607   45 572   16 622   52 055   656 158  
(2-3 yrs )  108 824   41 170   98 238   168 819   99 788   62 838   51 131   17 886   58 215   706 909  
(3-4 yrs )  119 287   43 414   100 194   181 963   104 137   66 804   54 203   17 933   58 527   746 462  
(4-5 yrs )  119 881   41 994   96 833   180 604   100 542   65 476   54 576   17 387   56 106   733 399  
(5-6 yrs )  123 790   41 794   96 986   187 620   99 603   66 617   53 979   17 332   54 931   742 652  
(6-7 yrs )  119 996   41 303   93 689   177 739   94 276   65 991   53 580   16 848   51 396   714 818  
Total 0-7  766 045   279 422   645 078   1 166 962   666 985   423 203   342 010   115 716   366 394   4 771 815  
(7-8 yrs )  112 890   38 618   89 497   166 128   84 294   61 731   50 470   16 253   48 355   668 236  
(8-9 yrs )  103 266   34 828   81 714   155 893   77 518   56 869   46 246   15 509   44 852   616 695  
Total 7-9  216 156   73 446   171 211   322 021   161 812   118 600   96 716   31 762   93 207   1 284 931  
(9-10 yrs )  98 578   33 822   77 787   159 740   75 727   54 849   44 767   14 760   43 140   603 170  
(10-11 yrs )  95 621   32 806   73 977   152 548   76 129   56 081   43 898   14 200   43 364   588 624  
Total 9-11  194 199   66 628   151 764   312 288   151 856   110 930   88 665   28 960   86 504   1 191 794  
(11-12 yrs )  99 546   31 806   70 234   155 238   76 031   55 910   42 453   14 646   42 083   587 947  
(12-13 yrs )  103 749   29 324   65 761   149 619   74 922   53 359   40 013   13 825   39 741   570 313  
(13-14 yrs )  103 480   28 646   62 864   143 549   75 175   53 799   38 285   13 274   37 942   557 014  
Total 11-14  306 775   89 776   198 859   448 406   226 128   163 068   120 751   41 745   119 766   1 715 274  
(14-15 yrs )  103 388   29 398   63 840   139 666   76 481   53 763   38 870   13 320   38 606   557 332  
(15-16 yrs )  103 458   29 461   60 137   135 218   77 318   52 387   38 049   12 792   35 752   544 572  
(16-17 yrs )  94 057   26 366   51 721   116 285   74 904   48 049   33 679   11 399   29 503   485 963  
(17-18 yrs )  44 272   13 718   21 709   61 419   44 040   24 919   13 508   5 311   12 185   241 081  
Total 14-18  345 175   98 943   197 407   452 588   272 743   179 118   124 106   42 822   116 046   1 828 948  
Key: EC – Eastern Cape; FS – Free State; GAU – Gauteng; KZN – KwaZulu Natal; Lim – Limpopo; MPU – Mpumalanga; NW –NorthWest; NC – Northern Cape; WC – Western Cape 
Source: South African Social Security Agency Third Quarter Indicator Report December 2011 
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Table 3: Changes in Age Eligibility and Grant Value Progression of the CSG 
Year  Age Eligibility  Grant Amount 
1998 – 2000 Children under 7 years  R 100 
2001 Children under 7 years R 110 
2002 Children under 7 years  R140  
2003 Children under 9 years  R 160 
2004 Children under 11 years R 170 
2005 Children under 14 years  R 180 
2008 Children under 15 years  ? 
2010 Children under 16 years  ? 
2011 Children under 17 years  R 270 
2012 Children under 18 years  R 280 
Source: Eyal et al (2011) 
As Table 3 indicates, both the age of eligibility and the value of the CSG have increased 
gradually over time from covering children less than 7 years (1998-2000), to covering 
children less than 18 years in 2012 and from a grant amount of R100 to its current value of 
R280 per month. The “follow the child” concept adopted for the implementation of the CSG 
is unique in that it recognized the varied and fluid nature of the family structure in South 
Africa and instead of linking the grant to a biological parent it allows the grant to be accessed 
by a primary caregiver. The primary caregiver is defined as anyone older than 16 years who is 
taking primary responsibility for the day to day needs of that child whether parent, relative or 
unrelated carer (Patel et al, 2012).  
2.2 Spending on CSG 
In the 2011/12 fiscal year, spending on social assistance in South Africa was R96,203 billion 
with a significant amount of that going towards the cost of the CSG as seen in Table 4 which 
shows social grants expenditure by type and province. It is the size of the CSG expenditure in 
South Africa’s social spending that forms part of the motivation for this paper. All in all, 
expenditure on social assistance represents approximately 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) corresponding to a 1.5% increase since 1994 (Laryea-Adjei et al 2011, Seeking 2007).  
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Table 4: Social grants expenditure by type and province, 2007/08– 2013/14 
 
 2008/09   2009/10   2010/11   2011/12   2012/13   2013/14 
 
2014/15 % Growth  
R million Actual 
  
Revised 
 estimate Projected 
 
 
per year 
Old-age 25,934 29,826 33,751   37,318   39,323  42,526  45,823 10.0%  
War veterans 20 17  14  12  13  10 11 -9.8%  
Disability 16,474 16,567  16,840   17,834   19,152   20,410  21,992 4.9%  
Foster care 3,934 4,434  4,616   5,245   5,952   6,216  6,697 9.3%  
Care dependency 1,292 1,434  1,586   1,948   1,857   2,107  2,270 9.9%  
Child support 22,348 26,670  30,342   34,036   38,237   41,553  44,774 12.3%  
Grant-in-aid 90 146  170   192   188   203  219 15.9%  
Social relief of distress 623 165  174   118   165   183  197 -17.5%  
Total 70,715 79,260  87,493   96,703   104,888   113,208  121,982 9.5%  
Province 
  
 
  
 
 Eastern Cape 12,557 13,914  15,281  16,761 18,119 19,556 21,073 
Free State 4,573 5,055  5,530  6,234 6,698 7,229 7,790 
Gauteng 8,289 9,390  10,539  11,871 13,030 14,063 15,153 
Kw aZulu-Natal 17,590 19,454  21,308  23,507 25,301 27,307 29,424 
Limpopo 9,656 10,855  11,986  12,318 14,111 15,231 16,410 
Mpumalanga 4,943 5,567  6,024  7,431 7,558 8,157 8,790 
Northern Cape 5,711 2,227  2,497  2,816 3,021 3,260 3,514 
North West 1,962 6,366  6,869  7,241 7,851 8,474 9,131 
Western Cape 5,434 6,432  7,460  8,524 9,199 9,930 10,698 
Total 70,715 79,260  87,493  96,703 104,888 11,3208 121,982 
Source: National Budget Review (2012) 
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Seeking (2007) argues that this is unique in that no other developing country redistributes as 
large a share of its GDP through social assistance programmes as South Africa is doing. More 
importantly, according to National Treasury (2011) projections, these costs are going to 
continue rising as the size and cost of the CSG is driven in the main by the progressive 
increases in the age limit and the means test threshold adjustments as seen in Table 5. 
Table 5: Child Grant Cost Projections (millions of Rand's) 
 
Year Child Support Grant Cost 
 
2005/06 14 143 
 
2006/07 17 559 
 
2007/08 19 625 
 
2008/09 22 348 
 
2009/10 26 670 
 
2010/11 30342 
 
2011/12 34 036 
 
2012/13* 38 237 
 
2013/14* 41 553 
 
2014/15* 44 774 
Source: National Budget Review 2009, 2011, 2012 
*Projections 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The impact of cash transfers (CTs) on poverty ultimately depends on how poor people use the 
money. Because cash is fungible, there are fears that recipients may misuse CTs on “sin 
goods” and other luxuries. This has, in the past led to policy makers preferring in-kind 
transfers to CTs. Another crucial distinction pertains to differentiating between what 
Devereux (2002) refers to as "livelihood protection" and "livelihood promotion" effects of 
anti-poverty interventions. The former refers to consumption smoothing and maintenance of 
minimum living standards while the latter refers to sustainable poverty reduction (a longer 
horizon concept). CTs have long been regarded as measures of livelihood protection during 
times of crisis although recent research has started questioning this traditional view 
(Devereux, 2002). Yet another important strand of the literature has pointed to the importance 
of making a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects of CTs (Sadoulet et al (2001)). 
Direct effects are the intended impact of the program without taking into account any 
spillover or general equilibrium effects. Indirect effects arise from the outcomes of the direct 
effects. These can either enhance the direct impacts or create unintended consequences that 
lead to other undesirable outcomes. Whilst the intended direct impact of both conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers such as the CSG are meant to improve the income of the 
beneficiaries, the direction of impact for the indirect effects are not always easily predictable. 
To illustrate the interaction of direct and indirect effects of CTs, Sadoulet et al (2001) make 
an example of credit as well as cash transfer programs. The former is shown to have the direct 
effects of loosening up liquidity constraints and expectedly boosting the incomes of 
borrowers. It can also have the indirect outcome of increased school attendance by children as 
a result of the children being relieved from work that competes with school.  
This section discusses the findings of studies that have explored the impact of grant income 
on the spending patterns of recipient households, with particular emphasis on the nutrition, 
incentive effects on savings and the labour market and poverty. 
Effects of Cash Transfers on Nutrition 
There are a number of papers discussing the nutritional benefits to children of increases in 
food expenditure resulting from receipt of CSG and social pensions. Agüero et al (2007) use 
children's height-for-age ratios as ex post indicators of nutritional inputs and find that 
KwaZulu-Natal children benefitted significantly in the first 3 years of their lives from CSG. 
The Department of Social Development conducted an evaluation to assess the impact of the 
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CSG on children, adolescents and their households. Using survey data from five provinces2 
and propensity score matching the study found that the CSG increases the probability of 
monitoring the growth of a child in the first two years of life by 7.7 percentage points which 
was found to be statistically significant at 10% level. This also led to an improvement of 
height-for-age scores for children whose mothers had more than eight grades of schooling. 
Yamauchi (2005) uses three rounds of the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) to 
show that grant financed nutritional improvements resulted in positive educational outcomes 
for children such as reducing age of commencing school and school grade repetition while the 
grade reached increased at the early stage of schooling. Williams (2007) shows that grants 
reduced significantly the probability of childhood hunger. 
 
With regard to old-age pensions, Duflo (2003) used ordinary least squares and two stage least 
squares to measure the impact of the old-age pension program on the anthropometric status of 
African children (ages 6-60 months). It emerged from the results that the gender of the grant 
recipient has a big influence on anthropometric status of the recipient. When the recipient of 
the pension is female there is a greater impact on girls than on boys with no impact when the 
recipient is male. Findings of Samson et al. (2004) and Lund (2006) corroborate these 
observations by verifying that the probability of nutrition improvements was higher in 
families with female pension recipients than those with male recipients. It appears that most 
evidence suggests that receipt of the CSG and old-age pensions encouraged school attendance 
among recipient children (Case et al, 2005; Budlender and Woolard, 2006; Leibbrandt et al, 
2010) with the only exception being the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) 
(2008) that reported no discernible difference between children receiving the grant and those 
not receiving the grant when aged between seven and 13 years. While there is overwhelming 
evidence of the positive effect on attendance from receipt of a grant in absolute terms, this 
must be nuanced by the fact that there is already high school enrolment and attendance rates 
in South Africa even in the absence of grants. Thus, as pointed out by Budlender and Woolard 
(2006), the evidence suggests that grant receipt implied significant reductions in school non-
attendance.  
Effects of Cash Transfers on Savings and Investment 
Most of the international evidence on cash transfers indicates that both the marginal 
propensity to save and the rate of return of investing out of this source of income are 
relatively high. Martinez (2005) found that pension transfers that were being invested in 
smallholder agriculture in Bolivia had the impact of increasing food consumption by twice the 
amount of the transfer received. By enhancing the ability of recipients to save and invest, cash 
transfers therefore reduce detrimental risk coping strategies such as the selling of productive 
assets. The evidence for South Africa of the incentive effect of grants on savings is less clear 
and complicated by the fact that the means test imposes an onerous effective marginal tax rate 
of 50 percent on non-pension incomes exceeding R606 per month (Van der Berg and Siebrits, 
2010). This suggests that the means-tested nature of the social old-age pension reduces the 
incentive for low-income earners to save for retirement (National Treasury, 2004). The actual 
impact of this disincentive on the savings decisions of lower-income workers behaviour 
remains unresolved. Nonetheless, there is, however, some scant evidence of a positive effect 
of grants on savings. Using pension transfers as an example, Duflo (2003) found that in South 
Africa old age unconditional pension recipients, both male and female, on average, saved 
67.5% of the transfer. With respect to investment the evidence is equally compelling with 
highly positive rates of return that households obtain on investing out of their cash transfers. 
Effects of Cash Transfers on Labour Market Behaviour 
                                                     
2 Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Western Cape 
9 
The main instrument used to provide unemployment benefits in South Africa is the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund which is a contribution-based social insurance institution. 
Grants are thus only given to people with disabilities among the working-age population 
(subject to the means test). Despite this, the social assistance system still has some impact on 
labour-market participation although the channels are different from those predicted by 
conventional theory (distortion of the relative prices of work and leisure) (van der Berg and 
Siebrits, 2010). A survey carried out by the Human Sciences Research Council under the 
South African Social Attitudes Survey revealed that the poor prefer labour-market income to 
that from grants (Noble et al, 2008). The grant system instead influenced labour supply 
through direct and induced effects on retirement decisions, household formation and job 
search activities (van der Berg and Siebrits, 2010). Direct effects, covering incentives actually 
faced by recipients, are largely influenced by the means test that discourages the elderly 
people from working after reaching eligibility age (by imposing an effective marginal tax rate 
of 50 percent on non-pension incomes referred to earlier). Disability grants also are subject to 
means test hence suffer similar discouraging effects. The situation is worsened by the high 
levels of unemployment and other labour-market disadvantages faced by elderly and disabled 
South Africans – according to van der Berg and Siebrits (2010), many members of these 
groups have limited skills and reside in rural areas where job opportunities are scarce. There 
is thus a small difference between the disability grant and available market wages implying 
little incentive for persons with disability to seek or take up paid work. Johannsmeier (2007) 
suggests that this is even more so for casual and temporary jobs.  
There are a number of studies exploring the induced or indirect labour market effects of the 
South African social assistance system and the results are rather mixed. A number of studies 
conclude that social pensions have become a main source of support for working age 
unemployed South Africans especially residing in rural areas (see for example Case and 
Deaton, 1998; Keller, 2004; Klasen and Woolard, 2008). Channels through which social 
pensions delay labour market participation postulated delays in new household formation by 
younger adults or discouraged job search by individuals now residing with families with 
pension income (Klasen and Woolard, 2008; Bertrand et al, 2003). Studies that have included 
migrant absentees in the definition of households have found that pension income access does 
in fact stimulate job search (see for example Posel et al, 2006; Sienaert, 2008), particularly for 
women.  Eyal and Woolard (2011) found a positive effect for Black mothers aged 20 to 45 of 
the CSG on the labour force participation, employment probability and unemployment 
(conditional on being a participant). With respect to the old-age pension, Ardington et al 
(2009) uses longitudinal data to assess the labour supply responses of adults to changes in the 
old-age pensioners in the household. In order to analyse unobservable household and 
individual characteristics that might influence labour market behaviour, households and 
individuals are compared before and after pension receipt, and pension loss. The results of 
this study show the strategic role that cash transfers can play in facilitating job search. 
Following the receipt of the transfer, the study found an increase in employment amongst 
adults in the household. The findings indicate that the cash transfer was used to finance the 
cost involved in job search as seen in the increase of labour migration upon pension arrival. 
Furthermore, migration in the case of prime-aged households with children was made 
possible by the fact that the pensioners were able to take care of children whilst their parents 
looked for work. Similarly, Williams (2007) concludes that CSG influences positively labour-
force participation by caregivers (but not their search behaviour or actual employment). All in 
all, CASE (2008) and Noble et al (2008) conclude that it is unlikely that there will be 
significant labour-supply effects given the small value of the CSG.  
 
Effects of Cash Transfers on Poverty 
Although not all cash transfer programs succeed in reducing poverty there is a significant 
body of international evidence to show that both conditional and unconditional cash transfers 
have had a positive impact (see Arnold et al, 2011; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Grosh, 2008; 
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and Rawlings, 2005). Devereux (2002) conveniently identifies three causes that facilitate the 
discussion of the effects of CTs on poverty. That is, chronic poverty is often associated with 
low productivity (due largely to unemployment or underemployment). Transitory poverty is 
often due to vulnerability to temporary shocks and an inability to cope with such shocks. 
Finally, dependency is often a major cause of poverty and related to personal characteristics 
such as old age, childhood or disabilities. Conventional wisdom is that CTs are best designed 
to address dependency related poverty.  
The South African social assistance system was designed to mitigate dependency-related 
poverty focusing on vulnerable groups falling outside the labour force (children, elderly and 
disabled people). A number of studies have shown that the grants system is effective at 
dependency related poverty largely because the grants are well targeted and have significant 
mitigating impacts on poverty. Studies by Woolard (2003), Armstrong et al (2008) and 
Armstrong and Burger (2009) have compared the actual incidence of poverty to the incidence 
that would have obtained if all households had earned zero income from social grants and find 
that social grants are effective at reducing poverty.  
Other pieces of work focusing on the effects of specific grants, (see for example Case and 
Deaton, 1998; Barrientos, 2003) and the social grants system as a whole (see for example 
Samson et al, 2004) come up with a similar conclusion. Yet some other indirect corroborating 
evidence of the poverty-reducing impact of social grants is provided in van der Berg et al 
(2008), The Presidency (2009), Van der Berg et al (2009) and Leibbrandt et al (2010). 
Armstrong and Burger (2009) show that poverty reduction effects of grants is sensitive to the 
poverty line chosen, with higher poverty reductions of social grants being associated with 
lowest poverty lines. While these studies provide compelling evidence, they are based on a 
very strong assumption that there are no general equilibrium effects of social grants, that is, 
there is no effect at all household behaviour in terms of labour supply, saving, household 
formation patterns and so on. As a result, it remains uncertain as to whether issues related to 
utilisation and incentive effects of grants would pen out.  
As discussed above under incentive effects pertaining to labour market and saving, there does 
not seem to be widespread evidence that grants are used to finance undesirable consumption 
patterns or other undesirable behavioural effects. Instead, the CSG and old-age pension have 
been used to enhance the nutrition and schooling of children. These are likely to enhance 
human capital and productivity in later years of these children. Similarly, allowing for 
migrant members in definition of households resulted not only in grants impacting on chronic 
poverty through sharing the proceeds and acting as a safety net but also facilitated labour-
market participation particularly of females and caregivers3. 
 
There is also growing evidence to show that the CSG played an important role in mitigating 
the impacts of economic shocks on South African households. Jacobs (2010) looked at how 
the most recent food price crisis and global economic downturn might have affected the food 
security status of low-income households. The results of this analysis not only showed that 
female-headed households in traditional huts and informal backyard shacks were severely 
                                                     
3 Seyisi and Proudlock (2009) assessed the impact on children and families of stopping the CSG at the age of 15 
using testimonies collected from caregivers of children aged 14 to 18 years. It emerged from the testimonies that 
families had been able to meet the nutritional needs of their children and the CSG was also playing an important 
role toward educational needs. Families where using the grant to buy school uniforms, lunch, stationary, transport 
to and from school and books. What is also interesting to note is that although most of the caregivers qualified for 
school fees exemption a significant number of them reported that they were not able to get the exemption and were 
therefore using the CSG for school fees. In meeting the transport needs of some of the children, especially in 
winter and the rainy season, the CSG ensured that children did not miss too many days from school. It was also 
clear that in cases were the primary caregivers were the grandparents of the child, the CSG offered relief to their 
Old Age Pension (OAP) which allowed them to continue meeting their own needs, such as medical care. 
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affected by the twin crisis but also highlighted the fact that households with CSGs fared better 
than households without. In terms of South Africa’s CSG contribution toward poverty 
reduction, a number of studies have found that it has contributed to reducing poverty as well 
as shielding children from adverse effects, particularly from the financial and economic crisis 
of 2008 and 2009 (Chitiga et al 2010; Ngandu et al 2010). According to SASSA (2011), in 
2007 there was a 9% drop in child poverty because of the CSG.  
These poverty impacts strengthen the case for at least maintaining the existing targeted social 
grants as an anti-poverty measure. What is less clear would be the developmental effects of 
existing coverage along the lines discussed in section 2.1 and 2.2, given that cash transfer 
schemes in South Africa were not really initially intended for such large numbers and less so 
at addressing these type of effects.  
As for the methodologies used to analyse some of the above impacts, with the exception of 
Samson et al (2004), very few studies use an economy-wide model to assess the impact of the 
CSG on the South African economy. Samson et al used a micro-simulation model to analysis 
the role of social assistance in reducing poverty and promoting household development. The 
study focused on effects on health, education, housing and vital services and used three 
different poverty measures to assess the extent of poverty in South Africa, the poverty 
headcount measure, the relative poverty gap measure and the rand poverty gap measure. 
Three data sources were used to calibrate the model, the September 2000 Income and 
Expenditure Survey, the September 2000 Labour Force Survey and administrative data from 
the Department of Social Development. The study identified 11 scenarios of possible social 
security reform which were then modelled using 7 different poverty lines. The authors find 
that the reduction in the poverty headcount ranges from 2% for the full take-up of the CSG 
among eligible children aged 0-7 to, 5.6%, for the full take-up of the CSG among eligible 
children aged 0-18 reforms. Focusing on the latter the results show that nearly 12 million 
additional grants, which represent an increase of over 2500% from baseline, are created. This 
has the impact of freeing over 1.4 million individuals from poverty approximately 1 million 
more individuals than the CSG 0-7 reform. Consistent with the poverty headcount the CSG 0-
18 produces the greatest impact on both destitution and the aggregate poverty gap, reducing 
them by 35.6% and 58.7% respectively. Unlike the Samson et al (2004) study, this paper goes 
beyond simply using a micro-simulation model by adopting a bottom-up/top-down modelling 
approach which utilises both a micro-simulation and computable general equilibrium 
models 4. The rest of this paper discusses the merits of such interventions from a South 
African perspective using this more sophisticated tool. 
4 MODELLING FRAMEWORK 
There are several channels for the household-level impacts of social grants:  
(1) changes in labour supply of different household members,  
(2) investments of some part of the funds into productive activities that increase the 
beneficiary household’s revenue generation capacity, and  
                                                     
4 As an illustration of the importance of incorporating such general equilibrium features, a study by Davies and 
Davey (2007) used a social accounting matrix approach to analyse the impact on the local economy of an 
emergency cash transfer programme in rural Malawi. This approach was used to try and capture the economy wide 
impacts of the cash transfer on the local economy.  Using the minimum requirements method to compute the 
multipliers the study found multiplier estimates between 2.02 and 2.45. The cash transfer program was found to 
have extensive multiplier effects on employment and local economic activities. Specifically, small farmers and 
businesses together with health and education also benefited from the secondary effects of the transfers. The ability 
of this type of economy-wide framework to pick up second round effects of transfers highlights the role that 
computable general equilibrium models can play in assessing the full impact of changes the transfer. 
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(3) prevention of detrimental risk-coping strategies such as distress sales of productive 
assets, children school drop-out, and increased risky income-generation activities 
such as commercial sex, begging and theft.  
Research has also documented three types of local economy impacts:  
(1) transfers between beneficiary and ineligible households,  
(2) effects on local goods and labour markets and  
(3) multiplier effects on income and/or welfare.  
This study focuses on the multiplier effects of CSG and the methodology developed which is 
described below will help with estimation of potential effects on South African households’ 
welfare and on the economy following a change in the CSG scheme.  
In particular, three simulation scenarios are presented as follows:  
1) Simulation 1 (sim1): A 20% increase in the value of the CSG for people already 
benefiting from the transfer.  
2) Simulation 2 (sim2): An increase in the number of beneficiaries by two million among 
the eligible children – (for more details on the selection of the new beneficiaries 
Appendix 1). 
3) Simulation 3 (sim3): Combines simulation 1 and simulation 2 with the additional 
beneficiaries from sim2 also benefiting from a 20 percent increase of the CSG from 
sim1. 
As mentioned earlier, there are two main justifications for the proposed simulations in South 
Africa. The first is that there is relatively little awareness of the economy-wide impact of 
social protection instruments such as the CSG. The second justification is that there is a 
strong possibility that plans are underway to accelerate reaching some 2 million eligible 
children who are not currently receiving the CSG for mainly administrative reasons.  
Conceptually, the modelling process starts with Step 1 which consists of micro-simulation 
modelling. Here the following variables will be estimated and fed into the Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model: 
i. Estimation of consumer prices and income elasticities and simulation of the effect of 
a change in CSG on consumption patterns 
ii. Estimation of a model for labour force participation and simulation of the effect of a 
change in the CSG on labour force participation 
Once the relevant changes are estimated, they are then transmitted to the macro (CGE) model. 
This constitutes Step 2 of the modelling process. This model simulates changes in different 
variables (e.g. volumes of consumption and production, prices, employment) which will then 
be inserted into the micro module in order to produce changes in poverty and inequality 
following the reform in the CSG scheme (Step 3).  
4.1 The micro model and the linking variables to the CGE module 
(bottom-up): 
The micro-economic module identifies two main channels through which the change in the 
CSG affects the economy: labour force participation and household consumption pattern. 
The models described hereafter are estimated based on the National Income Dynamic Study 
(NIDS) from 2008. 
Labour force participation 
With regards to the labour force participation, the change in the incentive to participate in the 
labour market due to a variation in the social transfer is estimated. Knowing whether labour 
force participation or employment are affected by CSG receipt is not obvious due to the 
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endogeneity of the CSG variable. In South Africa, as in most other contexts, the grant is not 
randomly assigned but its receipt is likely to be correlated to e.g. income, education, place of 
residence and bureaucratic restrictions. It follows that, if some modelling precautions are not 
taken into account, the CSG coefficient risks being biased. In order to check for and to take 
into account the endogeneity problems, we will follow, with major modifications Bertrand et 
al. (2003) and Eyal and Woolard (2011).  
We use an instrumental variable probit model (with the standard errors corrected for 
geographic clusters’ correlation), where the binary (dependant) variable is the labour force 
participation and the per household amount linked to the grant (continuous variable) is 
instrumented by the number of age eligible children residing in the household. The 
estimations follow the procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, pg. 472-477) and are 
computed by maximum likelihood estimation5. 
Formally, we estimated the following recursive model: 
1, 2, 1, 1, ,
,
2, 2 2, 1, 1, ,
,
Pr( 1 )i i j j i i
j i
i i j j i i
j i
y X y x u
y x x v
β α
η γ
 = = + +


= + +

∑
∑
      (1) 
Where, ( ),i iu v has a zero mean and bivariate normal variance, and is independent of J 
regressors x. 1,iy  and 2,iy are our endogenous variables for individual i taking binary and 
continuous values respectively. Regressors 1x enter both equations, while regressor 2x (vector 
of the additional instrument – number of age eligible children in the household, in our model) 
enters only the equation for 2y . 
All kinds of workers (for wage, self-employed and casual) and short-term unemployed are 
taken as participating in the labour force (following the definition reported in the Labour 
Force Survey reports in South Africa). The estimates are run on a sample of individuals not 
enrolled in school at the time of the survey and aged between 15 and 64 years old. Although 
we are aware that the CSG is more likely to affect mothers in the younger tail of the 
population, we used the entire working age population, as defined by Statistic South Africa 
and consistent with the definition of workers in the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used in 
the CGE. This model is then used to predict the change in the proportion (or probability) in 
labour force participation following the extension of the CSG. 
In order to check for coefficients’ robustness, the model was rerun only on individuals aged 
22 to 50 years old (not enrolled in school at the time of the survey). Finally, the sample was 
restricted only to people whose youngest child they live with, is aged between 12 and 15 (that 
is, just around the age eligibility threshold6), again, leaving those enrolled in school out of the 
analysis. By restricting the age group of beneficiary children, the heterogeneity of children’s 
needs is reduced, and labour supply behaviour (especially for women) is less likely to be 
affected by the presence of young children. 
Consumption 
The effect on household’s consumption behaviour (and on the aggregate demand for different 
goods) due to a change in the grant, is evaluated using the Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) 
system (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2009; Pendakur, 2008). The EASI system has the advantages 
of the Almost Ideal Demand (AID) System but none of its limitations. The AID System, just 
like the EASI has budget shares that are linear in parameters given real expenditures. 
However, unlike the AID System, EASI demands can have any rank and its Engel curves can 
                                                     
5 ivprobit Stata command was used to run these estimations. 
6 By the time of the survey we used, the age eligibility was set at 14. 
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have any shape over real expenditures. EASI error terms equal random utility parameters 
which account for unobserved preference heterogeneity. The EASI demand system in this 
study is estimated by an iterated three stage least squares model. The estimate provides prices, 
income and other variables (including the CSG) elasticity of different consumption 
categories.  
Consider the following cost function in the EASI class:  
( ) ( ) 1ln ln ln ln ln
2
j j j k j j
jkC p,u,z,ε = u+ m u,z p + a p p + ε p∑ ∑∑ ∑   (2) 
where u is the implicit utility7, p is the J-vector of prices p=[p1 , pJ ], and z demographic 
characteristics8.  By Shepard's Lemma, the Hicksian budget-share functions are: 
( ) ( ) lnj j k jjkw p,u,z,ε = m u,z + a p +ε∑       (3) 
where ajk  = akj  for all j, k. Implicit utility is given by : 
1ln ln ln ln
2
j j k
j jky = u = x w p + a p p−∑ ∑∑      (4) 
where ln ln jjx w p−∑ is the log of stone-index deflated nominal per capita expenditures. By 
substituting mj(u,z) by mj(y,z) where : 
( )j j r jr t tm y,z = b y + g z∑ ∑         (5) 
we finally get the implicit Marshallian Demand system : 
lnj r j t k jj r t jkw = b y + g z + a p +ε∑ ∑ ∑       (6) 
The selected consumption categories are meat, fish, fruit and vegetables, dairy products, rice 
and grains, starches, bakery, beverages and tobacco, other food, education and other non-food 
goods and services. Since the NIDS does not contain any direct and indirect information to 
construct the unit prices associated with each consumption category, we will use primary 
price data collected by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) (2008) at the provincial and regional 
levels. Apart from prices, other explanatory variables are gender and age of the household 
head, population group, household size, education level of the household head, total amount 
of CSG per household, total per capita household expenditure, and geo-type (rural formal, 
urban formal, urban informal and tribal authority). The CSG variable was instrumented as 
discussed above. 
After the estimation of coefficients in (6), we simulate the changes in consumption patterns 
(i.e. changes in the average consumption shares for all the categories) following the reform in 
the CSG scheme as proposed in the three simulation scenarios. These changes, together with 
those simulated for the labour force participation, are then plugged into the macro model 
(bottom-up). The new additional 2 million children benefiting from the CSG are estimated as 
described in Appendix 1. 
4.2 The Computable General Equilibrium model and the linking 
variables to the micro module (top-down): 
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used is based on the 2005 Supply and Use (SU) Tables 
obtained from StatsSA and other national data sets from various sources such as the Reserve 
                                                     
7 This utility is implicitly defined in terms of observables, namely expenditures x, prices p1, ..., pJ and budget-
shares in w1, ...wj. 
8 The first element of z is 1. 
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Bank of South Africa. The original SAM9 had 85 activities and commodities. For the purpose 
of this study, we aggregated this SAM into 12 activities and 12 commodities. We wanted to 
have the best possible match between the micro and macro models. Therefore, the 
sectors/commodities are as follows:  Meat, Fish, Fruit and vegetables, Dairy, Grain milling, 
Starches, Bakery, Other foods, Beverages and tobacco, Non alimentary products, Education, 
other products10.  
The SAM has two broad factors (labour and capital); four institutional sector accounts 
(households, enterprises, government and the rest of world); and two saving and investment 
accounts (change in inventories and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)).  
For the trade parameters, we use Gibson (2003) for the low-bound export supply. 
In terms of modelling, we use the static Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP 1-1) standard 
model by Decaluwé et al (2009), changing several assumptions to better reflect the South 
African economy and to better fit with the micro-model. First, we introduced unemployment. 
Indeed, South Africa faces high unemployment, but unions are very strong. As a result, wages 
and salaries are relatively rigid downwards. To take this rigidity into account, we assume that 
wages cannot decline. Thus, if production decreases, producers will not be able to decrease 
their wages below initial levels, and will therefore have to retrench some workers.  
To introduce the changes in households’ consumption shares, we assume that the households’ 
utility is a Cobb Douglas function, rather than a LES function as in PEP1-1.  
In terms of closure rules, the numeraire is the nominal exchange rate. As South Africa is a 
small country, world prices are assumed fixed. Labour is mobile across sectors whereas 
capital is sector specific. Public transfers and government spending are fixed. The rest of the 
world’s savings is fixed meaning that we do not allow South Africa to borrow from the rest of 
the world. 
The CGE will generate new prices and volumes after a change in the social transfer (as 
described above) and these changes will be transmitted to the micro module (top-down) in 
order to estimate changes in monetary poverty and inequality. In particular, the changes in 
consumer and producer prices, as well as of intermediate consumption prices and revenues 
from capital are integrated into the micro module and used to estimate the new real household 
expenditure per capita incorporating the multiplier effect in the economy that was generated 
by a change in the social grant. More specifically, we estimated the changes of employment 
status and its associated revenue, revenues from agriculture and non-agriculture sectors in 
comparison with the base year, and then obtained the total per capita change of household 
revenues associated with the two simulation scenarios. Due to the hypothesis that there are no 
savings, changes in revenues were fully transmitted into the consumption vector and used to 
estimate the equivalent income. 
The change in the employment status is carried out by using a multinomial logit model. For 
people aged between 15 and 64 years old who were not enrolled in school at the time of the 
survey, we first identified four possible statuses: wage worker, unemployed, self-employed 
and not participating in the labour market (i.e. not working or discouraged). After the model 
was estimated, we predicted the individual probability associated with each of the four 
categories. The relevant estimated changes produced by the CGE model – namely wage 
workers and unemployed – are then fed into the micro analysis. More specifically, an “x per 
cent” increase (decrease) in the rate of wage workers is transmitted to the micro data by 
changing accordingly the employment status among unemployed or people not participating 
in the labour market (wage workers) that showed the highest (lowest) probability of being 
wage workers. Similarly, when an “x per cent” increase in the unemployment rate is 
simulated, the corresponding absolute increase of people who were not participating in the 
                                                     
9 Davies R. and J. Thurlow (2011) A 2005 Social Accounting Matrix for South Africa. Washington DC, USA: 
International Food Policy research Institute. 
10 Note that this last category contains all the durable goods that are not taken into account in the micro model. 
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labour market and who showed the highest probability of being unemployed were moved to 
the pool of unemployed. If a decrease in the unemployment rate was simulated, the people 
who were initially unemployed and that showed the lowest probability of being unemployed 
were moved out of unemployment. Here it is assumed that the self-employed are not affected 
by changes in the employment status.  
Changes in the employment status are reflected in changes in wage income. People losing 
their wage jobs, experience a reduction in wage incomes equal to their observed wage; while 
those finding a wage job, have an increase in wage income equal to their predicted wage 
(calculated by estimating a Heckman selection model on some individual and household 
characteristics). For simplicity, it is assume that unemployed people do not benefit from 
South African unemployment subsidies if they become unemployed. In addition, the wage 
rate does not decrease as its initial value is initialised at the minimum value, which is imposed 
in the macro model. 
The change in the revenue from self-employment activities ( hπ∆ ) in the agriculture (food 
and non-food) sector, for household h is defined as: 
, ,
1
K
h k Y k k I k
k
Y p I pπ
=
∆ = ∆ − ∆∑         (7) 
where kY is the production value of good k at the base year, ,Y kp∆ is the change in producer 
price of good k (pre and after simulation), kI is the value of inputs purchased for the 
production of good k and ,I kp∆ is the change in price of inputs for the production of good k 
(the simulated changes in the price of intermediary goods are used). Note that self-
consumption is included in this income component, but its change is calculated by using 
changes in consumer prices, rather than in producer prices. 
Income from self-employment activities ( hϕ∆ ) in the non-agricultural sector, for household h 
is defined as: 
( )
1
J
h j j j
j
Y p VAϕ
=
∆ = ∆∑          (8) 
where jY is the production value of good j at the base year and ( )j jp VA∆ is the change in the 
value of the value-added good j (pre and after simulation).  
Changes in total household revenue ( hY∆ ) relative to the base year for each scenario can thus 
be written as: 
h i h h
i h
Y w E π ϕ
∈
∆ = ∆ ∆ + ∆ + ∆∑      (9) 
where the change in revenues from the wage sector comes from the variation in the wage rate 
( w∆ ) as well as in individual employment status ( iE∆ ), for all household members aged 15 
and older. 
Finally, the approach we used to evaluate the effect on households’ welfare following the 
simulated reforms of the CSG scheme is the one introduced by King (1983), referred to as 
equivalent income. According to this approach, for a given budget (pc, xc,h), the equivalent 
income, ec,h , is defined as the value of income ensuring the same utility level that would have 
been obtained with the budget (pr, ec,h). We derived ec,h starting from the EASI model as 
follows (for more details, see in Appendix 2): 
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1 1 1
1exp ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2
J J K
j j j j k j k
c,h c,h c r j k c c r r
j j k
e = x w p p + a p p p p
= = =
 
− − − 
 
∑ ∑∑   (10)
 
Where ,ln c hx is the log of per capita expenditure after simulation (i.e. per capita expenditure 
at base year plus the change in per capita revenue, as estimated before).To measure the 
poverty effects of the reform in the CSG scheme, the popular Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) 
(FGT) family of poverty indices is used. The FGT family of indices is defined as: 
, 0, , , , , ,
, ,
1
( , , )1( )
H
t h C k t c k t c h
c h c h
h
z e y
P z n
z
α
α ρ
= +
− 
=  
 
∑
p p
Ν
     (11)
 
Where z is the national monthly poverty line at the base year (equal to R502 (see Argent et 
al., 2009)), f+ = max(0, f), N is the number of households in the survey, nc,h is the size of the 
household h, ρc,h is the sampling weight of h, α is a parameter that captures the “aversion to 
poverty” or the distribution sensitivity of the poverty index, and et,h is the per capita 
equivalent income (as defined in 9) at time t (t corresponds the different scenarios we have – 
base year, sim1, sim2 and sim3 respectively). Here we report figures for α = 0, 1 and 2, 
measuring the incidence of poverty (headcount ratio), poverty gap and the severity of poverty 
respectively. 
To measure the inequality effects of the reform in the CSG, we use the well-known Gini 
index. Starting from the class of single-parameter Gini (see Duclos and Araar, 2006) indices 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1
0
;I p L p p dpρ κ ρ= −∫        (12) 
for ρ=2, we get the standard Gini index, with ρ being an ethical parameter, L(p) being the 
cumulative percentage of total income held by the cumulative proportion p of the population 
(ranked according to increasing consumption values) and κ(p, ρ) being the percentile-
dependent weights to aggregate the distances p-L(p). 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results of the labour force participation model are shown in Table 6. We present three 
specifications of the model differing only in the sample on which they are run, as described 
above. The coefficient associated with the total amount received by the household through the 
CSG is fairly robust across the three specifications. We always find a positive link between 
the CSG and the probability of participating in the labour force, although, as expected, the 
coefficient’s value is slightly higher when only people whose youngest children are around 
the age eligibility threshold are included (model 3). Estimates from specification (1) are 
finally retained for the simulation analysis. 
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Table 6: Results of the labour force participation model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CSG_amount_hh 0.000548** 0.000504* 0.00307*   
Age -0.00205 0.00691*** 0.0280*** 
ln_pcincome 0.0857*** 0.104*** 0.214*** 
Hhsize -0.0521*** -0.0568*** -0.0474 
Geo-type: rural formal (comparison modality) 
 tribal authority areas -0.452*** -0.522*** 0.192 
urban formal -0.267*** -0.284** 0.469 
urban informal -0.148 -0.186 0.184 
Province: Western Cape (comparison modality) 
 Eastern Cape 0.217* 0.306** 0.21 
Northern Cape 0.0977 0.153* 0.555 
Free State 0.296*** 0.296** -0.137 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.107 0.0987 0.255 
North West 0.330*** 0.370*** 0.431 
Gauteng 0.294*** 0.294*** 0.173 
Mpumalanga 0.329*** 0.381*** 0.586**  
Limpopo -0.00593 0.0138 -0.109 
Education: less than 7th (comparison modality) 
 less than 12th 0.147*** 0.161*** 0.211 
12th or more 0.357*** 0.312*** 0.202 
Marital status: married/living with partner (comparison modality) 
widow/divorced 0.0332 0.214** 0.502**  
never married -0.226*** -0.0959** 0.253 
_cons -0.326 -0.636*** -3.251*** 
total amount of CSG per hh (instrumented variable) 
n_child 106.5*** 104.7*** 64.93*** 
Rho -0.0636 -0.0531 -0.222 
N 15911 10944 784 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: *p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01; amount of CSG instrumented by n_child (the number of age eligible 
children); model (1) is estimated on the entire sample of working age people 15-64 (not currently enrolled in 
school), model (2) on people aged 22-50 (not currently enrolled in school), model (3) on people aged 22-50 (not 
currently enrolled in school) and living with children aged 12-15 (without younger children) 
 
Table 7 reports the quantity elasticities with respect to own price, expenditure and CSG for 
each category. They all take the expected sign, revealing an interesting heterogeneity across 
categories. Fruit and Vegetables, rice, starches and beverages are more responsive to a 
percent change in their price (more than proportionate reduction), while the own price 
elasticity for other non-food items is -0.84. Education and other non-food items are found to 
be superior goods as their demand increase by 1.70 and 1.17% respectively after a percent 
increase in household expenditure, whereas demand for rice and starches only rise by around 
0.60%. Finally, only education and other food categories are found to have a statistically 
significant CSG elasticity, 1.17 and 1.11 respectively. 
Table 7: Quantity elasticities with respect to own price, expenditure and CSG (with t-stat) evaluated at the 
sample mean 
  Own Prices Expenditures CSG Category Elasticity t-stat Elasticity t-stat Elasticity t-stat 
Meat -0.95 -21.22 0.78 43.98 0.86 -1.42 
Fish -1.11 -1.79 0.73 16.40 0.91 -0.19 
Fruit & Vegetables -1.15 -2.06 0.89 38.53 0.96 0.50 
Milk -0.96 -1.37 0.98 27.13 0.92 -0.14 
Rice -1.20 -3.76 0.58 35.43 0.95 0.45 
Starches -1.09 -3.96 0.60 24.84 0.97 0.74 
Bread -0.94 -4.43 0.74 29.88 0.84 -1.62 
Beverages -1.02 -9.28 0.82 43.51 0.93 -0.09 
Education -0.96 -16.07 1.70 34.45 1.17 2.33 
Other Food -0.98 -30.35 0.82 38.11 1.11 3.27 
Other non-Food -0.84 -2.58 1.17 42.45 0.88 0.79 
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Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: Calculation of elasticities is shown in Appendix 3. Standard errors are calculated with the Delta method. 
Elasticities values in bold are statistically significant at 5 percent. 
Both simulations represent three different shocks that are integrated into the macro model. 
The shocks only differ by their magnitude between the three simulations. Table 8 summarizes 
the results of the shocks: 
Table 8: Results from the micro model used for the macro model 
 
(Micro) sim1 (Micro) sim2 (Micro) sim3 
(Macro) Shock1: change in labour supply (in %, variation) 
 1.429 1.581 3.342 (Macro) Shock2: change in government transfer received by households (in %, variation) 
    (Macro) Shock3: Change in consumption shares (absolute difference) 
Meat -0.00031 -0.00015 -0.00048 
Fish 0.00011 0.00005 0.00018 
Fruit & Vegetables -0.00007 -0.00004 -0.00012 
Milk 0.00002 0.00001 0.00005 
Rice -0.00057 -0.00027 -0.00094 
Starches -0.00007 -0.00003 -0.00010 
Bread -0.00011 -0.00005 -0.00015 
Beverages 0.00014 0.00009 0.00031 
Education 0.00169 0.00064 0.00234 
Other Food 0.00011 0.00009 0.00023 
Other non-Food -0.00096 -0.00035 -0.00133 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are three shocks that are applied to the CGE model at the same 
time. Each one of them will have a different impact on the economy. Ceteris paribus, an 
increase in the labour force would have an impact on unemployment, as it is not feasible for 
firms to lower wages below the minimum wage. In the same way, an increase of the transfer 
households receive from government will increase their income and increase government’s 
deficit11. Finally, the changes in households’ consumption shares will have impacts on final 
demand. 
Volumes of households’ consumption follow the new repartition of the budget shares Table 9. 
Indeed, education and fish shares are increasing in households’ budget. Ceteris paribus, we 
expect their volume to increase. On the contrary, meat and rice’s shares are decreasing, so we 
expect their corresponding demand from households to decrease. 
Table 9: Impact on consumption volumes (in%) 
 sim1 sim2 sim3 Meat -0.91 -0.41 -1.4 
Fish 1.09 0.53 1.8 
Fruit & Vegetables -0.54 -0.24 -0.83 
Milk 0.19 0.13 0.4 
Rice -1.57 -0.72 -2.59 
Starches -0.65 -0.25 -0.91 
Bread -0.34 -0.13 -0.44 
Other food 0.28 0.22 0.57 
Beverages 0.23 0.17 0.48 
Education 4.95 1.93 6.93 
Other non-Food -0.04 0.04 0.02 
Source: Results from CGE model 
 
                                                     
11 Indeed, we assume that there is no fiscal policy adjustment to finance the increase of the CSG, and thus this 
increase, ceteris paribus, will increase government’s deficit 
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These changes in households’ consumption patterns will have an impact on the production of 
these sectors. For the alimentary products such as meat and fish commodities, final demand 
represents between 75 and 95% of the composition of total demand for commodities. Thus, 
this change in households’ consumption will have a large impact on their production. In 
contrast, the non-alimentary commodity rely more on intermediate demand from other 
sectors.  
 
Table 10: Impact on production volumes (in %) 
 
sim1 sim2 sim3 
Meat -0.92 -0.42 -1.43 
Fish 0.75 0.36 1.24 
Fruit & Vegetables -0.28 -0.11 -0.40 
Milk 0.19 0.14 0.41 
Rice -1.24 -0.58 -2.08 
Starches -0.69 -0.27 -0.97 
Bread -0.82 -0.35 -1.24 
Other food -0.04 0.03 0.00 
Beverages 0.13 0.10 0.28 
Education 4.48 1.75 6.27 
Other non-Food -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Source: Results from the CGE model 
 
As seen in Table 10 production increases, notably in the education sector. The labour 
intensive educational and diary sectors have to hire more workers for them to increase their 
production. This can be done in two ways; by hiring workers from other sectors whose 
production is decreasing or from the increase in the labour supply due to the cash transfer. 
The overall effect on labour is an increase by 0.04% and 0.05% respectively in the first and 
second scenarios. In the third scenario, where the two policies are combined, labour increases 
by 0.08%. 
This impact on the labour market, together with the increase in the transfer they receive, 
results in an increase in households’ income. Since consumption, direct taxes and savings are 
a proportion of agents' income, they logically increase in all scenarios. 
Government’s income increases, due to the increase in direct taxes receipts, as well as on 
indirect taxes (as consumption increases) and production taxes. However, given the increase 
in its transfers (i.e. the increase of the CSG), government’s savings are decreasing. This drop 
has an impact on total investment which decreases. This drop in investment will have an 
impact on non-alimentary and other food commodities, as they are the only ones which are 
consumed for investment purposes. The impact on price is hardly perceptible as seen in Table 
10. The consumer price index increases very slightly respectively by 0.022%, 0.014%, and 
0.03% in the three scenarios. 
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Table 11: Impact on consumer prices (in %) 
 
sim1 sim2 sim3 
Meat -0.15 -0.06 -0.22 
Fish 0.25 0.12 0.42 
Fruit & Vegetables -0.10 -0.05 -0.16 
Milk 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Rice -0.30 -0.13 -0.50 
Starches -0.12 -0.04 -0.16 
Bread 0.04 0.03 0.09 
Other food -0.02 0.01 0.00 
Beverages 0.06 0.05 0.13 
Education 1.34 0.53 1.86 
Other non-Food 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Results from the CGE model 
Before going into the poverty and inequality results, it is noteworthy to discuss briefly the 
budget cost of the different simulations proposed in this study. Simulation 1 would cost the 
Government 1.11% of GDP (in 2008 terms), while Simulation 2 and Simulation 3 would cost 
1.15% and 1.38% respectively. All the scenarios would call for a significant (probably 
unrealistic in the case of sim3) effort by the Government in terms of budget increase, as in 
2008 the CSG programme cost 0.93% of GDP.  
Table 12 to Table 18 report the results for poverty gaps and the inequality Gini index, by 
different groups. Table 12 and Table 13 show that P0 (Poverty Incidence), P1 (Poverty gap) 
and P2 (Poverty severity) decrease in comparison with the base year for the whole population 
and for children respectively. The improvement is particularly strong for poverty severity. As 
expected from the small changes in the relevant variables discussed above, the multiplier 
effects on the economy (namely changes in prices, incomes and employment) – other than the 
direct effect brought by the change in the CSG – have practically no further effects on 
households’ welfare. This is consistent with the fact that incomes for households living in 
poverty come primarily from grants and wages. In particular, for households around the 
poverty line, grants represent around 30% of total incomes while wages account for around 
45% (see Figure 1 in Finn, Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2009). In this model, the wage 
component does not change as the minimum wage binds, and the labour market results are 
impacted only through unemployment, without significantly affecting the employment rate. 
The remaining household income share is mostly represented by remittances and rental 
incomes, which are both unaffected in the short-run of these models. Other incomes and 
investments only account for a minimal part. 
In addition, for the national population, simulations 1 and 2 do not differ substantially, with 
poverty incidence under sim2 (+ two million beneficiaries) decreasing from 0.532 (base year) 
to 0.526 (versus 0.528 under sim1 (+20% of CSG value). This is not the case for P1 and P2, 
for which the two scenarios do not differ in terms of effectiveness of poverty reduction; P1 
and P2 go respectively from 0.261 and 0.156 (base year) to 0.250 and 0.145 (under both sim1 
and sim2). The Gini index decreases from 0.687 (base year) to 0.682 (under both sim1 and 
sim2). Interestingly, when we look at results for children only, the effectiveness of sim1 and 
sim2 in terms of poverty reduction varies according to the poverty measure. Sim2 is found to 
be more effective in reducing poverty incidence among children as the new 2 million CSG 
beneficiaries live in households relatively less poor than current beneficiaries, thus being 
closer to the poverty line. When this group is targeted, a larger reduction in P0 is thus 
reached, as this measure is sensitive to the density function of the group around the poverty 
line. Inversely, targeting children already benefiting from the CSG (sim1) allows a greater 
reduction in poverty depth and poverty severity, as this group – at the base year – is relatively 
poorer than non-beneficiary children and, thus, further from the poverty line. As well-know, 
indeed, P1 and, even more, P2 are particularly sensitive to the distributive function of the 
poor and the poorer tail in particular.  
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As expected, under sim3, poverty and inequality decrease substantially. According to our 
simulations, P0 would decrease by 1.3 percentage points, while P1, P2 and Gini by 2.4, 2.3 
and 1.1 respectively. If the multiplier effects are not taken into account, poverty incidence, 
poverty gap, poverty severity as well as the Gini index, do not change.  
Poverty and inequality effects primarily depend on the distribution of CSG across the 
different population groups; the distribution of CSG beneficiaries observed in the base year 
will affect the results associated with sim1, while the simulated increase in the number of 
beneficiaries by 2 million will be reflected on the results for sim2. As for sim1, Limpopo, 
together with Eastern Cape, as expected, show the largest poverty reduction as they are the 
provinces with the largest share of CSG beneficiaries at the base year (see Table 18). This 
will be the case also for households living in tribal authorities and for the African population 
group. Concerning sim2, Northern Cape is the province where the largest increase in the 
number of additional beneficiaries (in percent and in percentage points) is simulated, as well 
as for the African population group (see Table 18, au-dessous). Of course, the final results on 
the incidence of poverty will critically depend on the distribution of CSG (observed and 
simulated) of those around the poverty line, while changes in Gini inequality index will be 
affected primarily by the changes occurring for those in the middle of the expenditure 
distribution. 
Results by provinces (as shown in Table 14) reveal a heterogeneous impact linked to the CSG 
reform. In most cases, the same trends as in the national figures are observed, except for 
Northern Cape where under sim2, there is a deterioration – although small – in inequality 
when multiplier effects are included. As expected, African and Coloured households benefit 
the most from the CSG proposed reforms, while Whites are not affected (see Table 15 in 
Appendix 4). Interestingly, Indians largely benefit from a 20 percent increase in the value of 
the CSG in terms of headcount poverty reduction as a large part of households receiving the 
CSG are around the poverty line (see Figure 2 in Appendix 4). Rural formal, tribal authority 
and urban informal improve their households’ welfare under both simulation scenarios; 
poverty is not affected for households living in formal urban areas under sim1 but is reduced 
under sim2 (see Table 16 in Appendix 4). However, in sim2, contrary to what is observed 
elsewhere, results are less effective than sim1 in reducing P0 as a large part of new 
beneficiaries under sim2 are too far from the poverty line. Finally, poverty among beneficiary 
(at the base year) children is so widespread that the proposed policy reforms are not capable 
of substantially impacting child poverty and welfare in general (see Table 17 in Appendix 4). 
Under sim2 children living in households who were not CSG beneficiaries at the base year 
substantially improve their welfare. This is reflected in the change in P0, which moves from 
0.300 to 0.279. 
The monthly cost of 1 percentage point reduction in poverty gap (P1) amongst children is: for 
sim1, R204 950 019; for sim2, R234 965 035 and for sim3, R222 991 915. From these results, 
we can conclude that Sim1 is the most cost effective of the policies.  
  
23 
 
Table 12: Poverty Incidence, gap and severity and Gini index for base year, sim1, sim2 and sim3, whole 
population 
     Sim 1   Sim2   Sim 3 
 
Reference 
Situation 
 
with 
multiplier 
effect 
without 
multiplier 
effect  
with 
multiplier 
effect 
without 
multiplier 
effect  
with 
multiplier 
effect 
without 
multiplier 
effect 
P0 0.532 
 
0.528 0.528 
 
0.526 0.526 
 
0.518 0.518 
P1 0.261 
 
0.250 0.250 
 
0.250 0.250 
 
0.237 0.237 
P2 0.156 
 
0.145 0.145 
 
0.145 0.145 
 
0.133 0.133 
Gini 0.687   0.682 0.682   0.682 0.682   0.676 0.676 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: figures in bold indicates the cases where the difference between the reference situation is statistically 
different from zero. As for figures not including the multiplier effect, the difference is calculated with respect to the 
corresponding scenario including the multiplier effect. Statistical tests, as well as P0, P1, P2 and Gini figures, are 
run with the DASP statistical package (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
 
Table 13: Poverty Incidence, gap and severity and Gini index for base year, sim1, sim2 and sim3, children 
      Sim 1   Sim2   Sim 3 
 
Reference 
Situation  
 
with 
multiplier 
effect 
without 
multiplier 
effect 
 
with 
multiplier 
effect 
without 
multiplier 
effect 
 
with 
multiplier 
effect 
without 
multiplier 
effect 
P0 0.655 
 
0.649 0.649 
 
0.647 0.647 
 
0.634 0.634 
P1 0.338 
 
0.321 0.321 
 
0.320 0.320 
 
0.299 0.299 
P2 0.206 
 
0.188 0.188 
 
0.190 0.190 
 
0.170 0.170 
Gini 0.681   0.672 0.672   0.672 0.672   0.662 0.662 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: figures in bold indicates the cases where the difference between the reference situation is statistically 
different from zero. As for figures not including the multiplier effect, the difference is calculated with respect to the 
corresponding scenario including the multiplier effect. Statistical tests, as well as P0, P1, P2 and Gini figures, are 
run with the DASP statistical package (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
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Table 14: Poverty Incidence and Gini index for base year, sim1, sim2 and sim3 (by province), whole population 
  Reference situation 
  sim1   sim1   sim2   sim2   sim3   sim3 
 
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect  
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect  
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect 
 P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini   P0 Gini  P0 Gini 
Western Cape 0.324 0.634  0.323 0.633  0.323 0.633  0.322 0.633  0.322 0.633  0.320 0.631  0.320 0.631 
Eastern Cape 0.731 0.679  0.727 0.669  0.727 0.669  0.724 0.670  0.724 0.670  0.714 0.658  0.714 0.658 
Northern Cape 0.428 0.561  0.423 0.557  0.423 0.557  0.420 0.554  0.420 0.555  0.413 0.549  0.413 0.549 
Free State 0.517 0.618  0.510 0.612  0.510 0.612  0.516 0.613  0.516 0.613  0.508 0.606  0.508 0.606 
KwaZulu 
Natal 0.700 0.771  0.692 0.765  0.692 0.765  0.697 0.766  0.697 0.766  0.688 0.758  0.688 0.758 
North West 0.493 0.638  0.486 0.633  0.486 0.633  0.487 0.633  0.487 0.633  0.481 0.627  0.481 0.627 
Gauteng 0.319 0.605  0.318 0.603  0.318 0.603  0.312 0.602  0.312 0.602  0.303 0.599  0.303 0.599 
Mpumalanga 0.462 0.651  0.461 0.647  0.461 0.647  0.451 0.647  0.451 0.647  0.448 0.642  0.448 0.642 
Limpopo 0.692 0.648   0.688 0.638   0.688 0.638   0.683 0.640   0.683 0.640   0.672 0.628   0.672 0.628 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: Here we do not show statistical test for the difference of P0 and Gini figures as we took as the primary sampling unit variable (used to set the complex data survey) 
corresponds to the province variable. P0 and Gini figures are run with the DASP statistical package (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The paper set out to assess the impact of the CSG on the South African economy. The rationale for 
this study arose from the fact that although the positive impacts of the CSG on recipients are widely 
acknowledged very little is known about the economy-wide impacts of the grant.  
To quantify the impact of the CSG on the South African economy a bottom up/top-down modelling 
approach was employed. A micro-simulation model was used in the first instance to estimate 
consumer prices and income elasticities and the simulation of the effect of a change in CSG on 
consumption patterns. This was followed by estimation of a model for labour force participation and 
a simulation of the effect of a change in the CSG on labour force participation. In the second stage 
the relevant changes were estimated and then transmitted to the macro (CGE) model. The simulated 
changes in different variables were then inserted into the micro module in order to produce changes 
in poverty and inequality following the reform in the CSG scheme.  
Three simulations were conducted based on two potential policy developments regarding the CSG; an 
increase in the value of the grant and an increase in the number of grant recipients, in line with 
current policy discussions around extending coverage to 2 million children who are currently not 
being covered. Simulation 1 (sim1) simulated an increase in the value of the CSG by 20% for people 
already benefiting from the transfer. Simulation 2 (sim2) saw an increase in the number of 
beneficiaries by 2 million and then finally, a third simulation (sim3) combined the two simulations.  
The results of the labour force participation model found that there was a positive link between the 
CSG and the probability of participating in the labour force. With respect to the responses of the 12 
products to own and cross price, expenditure and the CSG, the results showed the lack of uniformity 
across product categories. Fruit and vegetables, rice, starches and beverages are more responsive to a 
percent change in their price while the own price elasticity for other non-food items is -0.84. The 
results seem to suggest that increases in the CSG will have a profound impact on education and other 
non-food items. Not only are these found to be superior goods since their demand increases by 1.70% 
(education) and 1.17% (non-food) after a percent increase in household expenditure, but they are the 
only ones with a statistically significant elasticity with respect to the CSG, 1.17% (education) and 
1.11% (non-food).  
The results from the CGE model are encouraging as they showed that there is an increase in the 
consumption and production of education and the nutritious fish product. The positive impact on the 
labour market, together with the increase in the transfers received by households, results in an 
increase in their income. There is an increase in government’s income due to the increase in direct 
taxes, consumption and production taxes. However, given the increase in its transfers (i.e. the 
increase of the CSG), government’s savings decrease which leads to a decrease in total investment. 
Given that the 2008 CSG programme cost 0.93% of GDP all three simulations impose a significant 
cost on government with sim1 costing 1.11% of GDP (in 2008 terms), while sim2 and sim3 would 
cost 1.15% and 1.38% respectively. This means that from a cost perspective sim1 would be the better 
of the three policies. 
When it comes to poverty measures and inequality, the results show that, other than the direct effects 
brought by the change in the CSG, the multiplier effects (captured via changes in prices and volumes) 
have no further impacts on household welfare. This is consistent with the fact that incomes for 
households living in poverty come prevalently from grants and wages; in the model the latter 
component does not change as the minimum wage binds, and the labour market reacts to shocks 
uniquely through unemployment. Relative to the base year there is a strong improvement in the 
poverty incidence, gap, severity and Gini index for the whole population and for children. Although 
poverty incidence differs slightly under sim1 and sim2 for the national population in the two 
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scenarios, reduction in poverty gap and severity as well as in inequality is the same under both 
simulations. Finally, as expected, under sim3, poverty and inequality decrease substantially.  
Poverty and inequality effects were primarily influenced by the distribution of CSG across the 
different population groups; the distribution of CSG beneficiaries observed in the base year affected 
the results associated with sim1, while the simulated increase in the number of beneficiaries by 2 
million was reflected on the results for sim2. The results showed that, as expected, for sim1, 
Limpopo, together with Eastern Cape, show the largest poverty reduction as they are the provinces 
with the largest share of CSG beneficiaries at the base year. 
At a regional level, the results showed heterogeneous impacts linked to the CSG reform with the 
same trends as in the national figures being observed, except for Northern Cape where, under sim2, 
there is a deterioration, although small, in inequality when multiplier effects are included.  
The results also showed that in terms of race, African and Coloured households benefit the most from 
the CSG proposed reforms, while Whites were not affected. Indians largely benefited from the 20 
percent increase in the value of the CSG in terms of headcount poverty reduction as a large part of 
households receiving the CSG are around the poverty line.  
Based on geographical zones the results showed that rural formal, tribal authority and urban informal 
improve their households’ welfare under both simulation scenarios; poverty is not affected for 
households living in formal urban areas under sim1 but is reduced under sim2. However, in sim2, 
contrary to what is observed elsewhere, results were less effective than sim1 in reducing poverty 
incidence as a large part of new beneficiaries under sim2 are too far from the poverty line.  
Finally, poverty among beneficiary (at the base year) children is so widespread that the proposed 
policy reforms are not capable of substantially impacting child poverty and welfare in general. Under 
sim2 children living in households who were not CSG beneficiaries at the base year substantially 
improve their welfare. This is reflected in the change in poverty incidence, which moved from 0.545 
to 0.532. The cost of 1 percentage point reduction in poverty gap amongst children is: for sim1, R204 
950 019; for sim2, R234 965 035 and for sim3, R222 991 915. From these results, we can conclude 
that Sim1 is the most cost effective of the policies.  
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
A. SELECTION OF THE NEW 2 MILLION CSG BENEFICIARIES 
We first estimated among age eligible children the probability of receiving the CSG through a probit 
model. 
( )i v i iprobit Xπ α β ε= + +         Eq. (A.1) 
with 
( )i i iE Y Xπ =          Eq. (A.2) 
Where iY  is a binary variable taking value 1 if the child receives the grant, 0 otherwise. Vector iX
identifies a group of V individual and household characteristics affecting the effective reception of the 
grant, namely child’s age (and its square value), his/her gender, the education level of his/her 
household head, the log of the per capita income, his/her household size, the geo-type, the province, 
whether he/she has a birth certificate, his/her ethnicity, whether his/her mother is alive and whether 
she lives with the child. 
The estimated coefficients are then used to predict the probabilities of receiving the CSG. The new 
two million beneficiaries are finally chosen among age eligible children, not receiving the grant at the 
base year, and showing the highest probability to receive it. Only children up to 13 years old 
(included) have been retained for this simulation. Although the current age eligibility is up to 14 
included, once reached the age of 14 years old, a child is very unlikely to become a new beneficiary. 
B. CALCULATION OF THE EQUIVALENT INCOME 
The equivalent income ,c he is the level of income, at the reference price rp , ensuring the same utility 
level than that obtained with the income level ,c hx and the price system cp : 
( ) ( )c c,h r c,hv p ,x = v p ,e        Eq. (B.1) 
where v (.) is the indirect utility function and rp  is the reference price system. By reversing the 
indirect utility function, we obtain the equivalent income in terms of expenditure function: 
( )c,h r c c,he = e p , p ,x         Eq. (B.2) 
where ,c he  is the equivalent income of household h living in stratum c, facing the cp  system prices, 
and enjoying a level of nominal income per capita (or per adult equivalent) ,c hx . The function 
( )c,h r c c,he = e p , p ,x is increasing with respect to rp  and ,c hx , decreasing with respect to cp , 
concave and homogeneous of degree one with respect to the reference price, and is continuous with 
first and second derivatives for all arguments (King, 1983). 
Consider the cost function of the EASI class:  
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( ) ( ) 1ln ln ln ln
2
j j j k
jkC p,u,z = u+ m u,z p + a p p∑ ∑∑
   Eq. (B.3)
 
where u is the implicit utility 12 , p is the J-vector of prices p=[p1 , pJ ], and z demographic 
characteristics13. By Shepard's Lemma, the Hicksian budget-share functions are: 
( ) ( ) lnj j kjkw p,u,z = m u,z + a p∑       Eq. (B.4) 
where jk kja a= for all j, k. Implicit utility is given by : 
1ln ln ln ln
2
j j k
j jky = u = x w p + a p p−∑ ∑∑     Eq. (B.5) 
Where ln ln jjx w p−∑ is the log of stone-index deflated nominal expenditures. From B.4, we have : 
( ) ( ) lnj j kjkm u,z = w p,u,z a p−∑       Eq. (B.6) 
By substituting B.6 in B.3, we have: 
( ) ( )( ) 1ln ln ln ln ln2
j k j j k
jk jkC p,u,z = u+ w p,u,z a p p + a p p−∑ ∑ ∑∑
 Eq. (B.7)
  
With total per capital nominal expenditures ,c hx  and prices cp we enjoy a level of utility u0: 
,
1ln ln ln ln
2
j j j k
c h c,h c jk c cu = x w p + a p p−∑ ∑∑
    Eq. (B.8)
 
We finally get the equivalent income ,c he by solving : 
( ) ( )( ), 1ln ln ln ln ln ln2
j k j j k
r c,h c h r jk r r jk r rC p ,u,z = e = u + w p ,u,z a p p + a p p−∑ ∑ ∑∑  Eq. (B.9) 
from where: 
( ) ( ),
1 1 1
1exp ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2
J J K
j j j j k j k
c,h c,h c r j k c c r r
j j k
e = x w p p + a p p p p
= = =
 
− − − 
 
∑ ∑∑
 
Eq. (B.10)
 
C. CALCULATION OF ELASTICITIES 
C.1. Calculation of price elasticities in the EASI system 
 
Consider the EASI implicit marshallian demand system: 
 
lnj j r j kr t t jkw = b y + g z + a p∑ ∑ ∑       Eq. (C.1.1) 
where :  
                                                     
12 This utility is implicitly defined in terms of observable variables, namely expenditures x, prices p1, ..., pJ and budget-
shares in w1, ...wj. 
13 The first element of z is 1. 
33 
1ln ln ln ln
2
j j j k
jky = x w p + a p p−∑ ∑∑      Eq. (C.1.2) 
and 
j jj p qw =
x
         
Eq. (C.1.3)
 
we have : 
- pj = nominal price of good j, 
- qj = amount of good j, 
- x= total expenditure. 
So, we have:  
j
j j j
i i j j
xw
Q p wx= +
p p p p
∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂
       
Eq. (C.1.4)
 
Moreover: 
1lnj j jk k jij r
r
i i i i
w w a p a
= + rb y +
p p p p
− ∂ −  ∂  
∑ ∑      Eq. (C.1.5) 
This allows us to write: 
j
jj j j i
i i i i j
xw
pQ Q w p= +
p p p p w
  
∂   ∂ ∂  
 ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
 
      
Eq. (C.1.6)
 
Hence, the elasticity of good j with respect to income ije is: 
( ) 1
ln
1 jk k jii j rij r
j j j
a p awe = i = j + rb y +
w w w
−
 
− ∗ −  
 
∑ ∑     Eq. (C.1.7) 
C.2. Calculation of income elasticities in the EASI system 
If we consider C.1.1, C.1.2 and C.1.3 we have:  
1j j
j
j j
Q wx= w +
x p p x
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
       
Eq. (C.2.1)
 
Moreover: 
1j r
j rw rb y=
x x
−∂
∂
∑
        
Eq. (C.2.2)
 
It follows that: 
11 j rj r
j
j j
Q rb yx= w +
x p p x
−∂
∂
∑
       
Eq. (C.2.3)
 
Hence, the elasticity of good j with respect to income xje is: 
1
1
j r
rx
j
j
rb y
e = +
w
−∑
        
Eq. (C.2.4) 
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Table 15: Poverty Incidence and Gini index for base year, sim1 and sim2 (by main ethnicity), population 
  Reference 
situation 
  sim1   sim1   sim2   sim2   sim3   sim3 
 
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect  
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect  
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect 
 P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini   P0 Gini  P0 Gini 
African 0.625 0.597  0.621 0.588  0.621 0.588  0.618 0.589  0.618 0.589  0.610 0.579  0.610 0.579 
Coloured 0.315 0.566  0.314 0.564  0.314 0.564  0.309 0.563  0.309 0.563  0.306 0.560  0.306 0.560 
Asian/Indian 0.173 0.526  0.135 0.525  0.135 0.525  0.173 0.526  0.173 0.526  0.135 0.525  0.135 0.525 White 0.029 0.456   0.029 0.456   0.029 0.456   0.029 0.456   0.029 0.456   0.029 0.456   0.029 0.456 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: figures in bold indicates the cases where the difference with the reference situation is statistically different from zero. As for figures not including the multiplier effect, the 
difference is calculated with respect to the corresponding scenario including the multiplier effect. Statistical tests, as well as P0 and Gini figures, are run with the DASP statistical 
package (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
 
Table 16: Poverty Incidence and Gini index for base year, sim1, sim2 and sim3 (by geo-type zone), population 
  Reference situation 
  sim1   sim1   sim2   sim2   sim3   sim3 
 
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect  
with multiplier 
effect  
without 
multiplier effect  
with multiplier 
effect  
wihout multiplier 
effect 
 P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini   P0 Gini  P0 Gini 
Rural formal 0.601 0.593  0.584 0.587  0.584 0.587  0.592 0.586  0.592 0.586  0.574 0.578  0.574 0.578 Tribal Authority 0.815 0.499  0.809 0.484  0.809 0.484  0.808 0.488  0.808 0.488  0.797 0.471  0.797 0.471 Urban formal 0.305 0.635  0.304 0.633  0.304 0.633  0.301 0.633  0.301 0.633  0.300 0.631  0.300 0.631 
Urban informal 0.626 0.488   0.619 0.479   0.619 0.479   0.616 0.479   0.616 0.479   0.598 0.469   0.598 0.469 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: figures in bold indicates the cases where the difference with the reference situation is statistically different from zero. As for figures not including the multiplier effect, the 
difference is calculated with respect to the corresponding scenario including the multiplier effect. Statistical tests, as well as P0 and Gini figures, are run with the DASP statistical 
package (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
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Table 17: Poverty Incidence and Gini index for base year, sim1, sim2 and sim3 (by recipient households), children 
      sim1   sim1   sim2   sim2   sim3   sim3 
 
Reference 
situation   w/ multiplier effect  
w/o multiplier 
effect  w/ multiplier effect  
w/o multiplier 
effect  w/ multiplier effect  
w/o multiplier 
effect 
 P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini  P0 Gini   P0 Gini  P0 Gini 
Non-CSG 
Recipient 0.300 0.622  0.300 0.622  0.300 0.622  0.279 0.614  0.279 0.614  0.274 0.612  0.275 0.612 
CSG 
Recipient 0.816 0.445  0.807 0.428  0.807 0.428  0.814 0.435  0.814 0.435  0.798 0.416  0.797 0.416 
Total 0.655 0.681   0.649 0.672   0.649 0.672   0.647 0.672   0.647 0.672   0.634 0.662   0.634 0.662 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: figures in bold indicates the cases where the difference with the reference situation is statistically different from zero. As for figures not including the multiplier effect, the 
difference is calculated with respect to the corresponding scenario including the multiplier effect. Statistical tests, as well as P0 and Gini figures, are run with the DASP statistical 
package (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
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Table 18: Distribution of CSG (observed at the base year and simulated according to sim2) 
 
base year 
 
sim2 
Province 
   Western Cape 0.267  0.345 
Eastern Cape 0.627  0.777 
Northern Cape 0.512  0.688 
Free State 0.521  0.667 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.572  0.697 
North West 0.562  0.719 
Gauteng 0.433  0.569 
Mpumalanga 0.521  0.633 
Limpopo 0.646  0.796 
geo-type zone    
Rural Formal 0.572  0.721 
Tribal Authority 0.665  0.813 
Urban Formal 0.362  0.468 
Urban Informal 0.636  0.805 
population group    
African 0.638  0.800 
Coloured 0.319  0.394 
Asian/Indian 0.160  0.160 
White 0.026  0.026 
National 0.532  0.666 
Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
 
 
 
Figure 19 about here 
Figure 1: Non-parametric distribution of total CSG (in Rand) per household (by population groups) 
Description: Household distribution of the Child Support Grant  
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Source: authors’ estimation based on NIDS 2008 
Note: the figure was constructed with the DASP statistical package (Araar and Duclos, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
